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Post-truth and fake news
Alex Law
Fake news is big news. Until recently ‘fake news’ referred to political satire shows 
like The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and 
The Colbert Report. It now appears that 
satire has been killed stone dead. Political 
reality is perpetuating so many outrageous 
spectacles, self-righteous tantrums, 
opinionated absurdities and outright lies 
that political satire simply struggles to 
compete with reality. Facts have become a 
stake in adversarial political contests rather 
than a generally agreed aspect of a shared 
reality. During the Brexit referendum, the 
Leave campaign falsely claimed that the UK 
exchequer would save £350 million pounds 
every week outside of the EU. In Scotland, 
Project Fear, as the No campaign was self-
styled, engaged in fantastical exaggerations 
of catastrophe in the event of a Yes vote in 
the 2014 Independence referendum.
This seems like small beer compared to the 
scale of lies and petulance of US media 
politics. This reached fever pitch during 
and after the 2016 US elections when a 
reality TV celebrity won the Presidency 
against a seasoned political operator long 
versed in the dark arts of spin. One estimate 
claimed that 78 percent of Donald Trump’s 
factual statements fell into the category 
of untruth (Pomerantsev, 2016). Lies, 
falsehoods, and untruths are no barrier 
to political popularity. They have been a 
feature of politics since universal suffrage. 
Nevertheless, something more fundamental 
appears to be at stake in the multiple crises 
of political representation today.
Trump and his White House staff have 
committed so many blunders and 
inaccuracies that to some it seems that this 
may be a deliberate policy to misdirect the 
US media and undermine the credibility 
of journalists (Shreckinger and Gold, 
2017). For instance, White House staff 
wrongly claimed that two Iraqi refugees 
committed a ‘massacre’ in Bowling Green, 
Kentucky, as part of a bungled effort to 
bolster Trump’s travel ban on citizens 
of (predominately Muslim) ‘countries of 
concern’. Most notoriously, White House 
press secretary Sean Spicer claimed that 
the use of chemical weapons of civilians 
by the Assad regime in Syria was so 
uniquely evil that “someone as despicable 
as Hitler didn’t even sink to using chemical 
weapons”, forgetting, of course, the use of 
chemicals in the systematic mass murder 
in Nazi concentration camps. Spicer also 
told experienced reporter April Ryan at a 
briefing on White House connections to 
Russia to “Stop shaking your head . . . At 
some point, report the facts”. He wrongly 
accused Iran of attacking an American 
warship and repeatedly claimed that a 
terrorist attack took place in Atlanta, 
Georgia (he may have meant Orlando). Yet 
Trump point-blank refused to fire Spicer on 
market share grounds: “That guy gets great 
ratings. Everyone tunes in”.
Rather than a conspiracy of misinformation 
orchestrated by the White House some 
see the chaotic media relationship as a 
transparent expression of Trump’s intuitive 
passive-aggressive personality (Gaber, 
2017). Some in the US press corps are more 
generous in their understanding of the 
pressure and scrutiny that the relatively 
inexperienced Trump team are coming 
under. As one journalist put it: “Mostly 
they’re just reactive and incompetent. They 
don’t have time, man. Their ass is on fire all 
day, every day. These are not evil geniuses. 
It’s not some sort of wonderful, malevolent 
plot to destroy the media. These people are 
in a 24-7 state of panic”(Shreckinger and 
Gold, 2017).
For their part, under pressure journalists 
are also prone to mistakes, as when a Time 
journalist erroneously claimed that on 
taking office Trump had replaced a bust of 
Martin Luther King with one of Winston 
Churchill, circulated widely online. This 
allowed Trump to return to his campaign 
rhetoric about the ‘fake news’ agenda of 
the liberal media establishment. At a Black 
History month gathering Trump argued: 
“You read all about Dr. Martin Luther King 
a week ago, when somebody said I took the 
statue out of my office and it turned out 
that that was fake news. Fake news”. Trump 
also publicly refused to take questions 
from a CNN reporter on the grounds of the 
network “peddling fake news”.
By amplifying the incompatibility of 
competing versions of reality an atmosphere 
might be created that reliable factual 
veracity is simply impossible to achieve. 
This follows a well know PR strategy to 
incinerate unwanted scientific evidence by 
creating a firestorm of contention. Trump 
constantly complains about the biases 
of “lamestream” media. Yet, as one study 
shows, people who vent their suspicions of 
the ‘mainstream media’ tend be more liable 
to uncritically consume misinformation 
(Pomerantsev, 2016). There is emotional 
comfort to be had in selective ignorance.
It is, of course, not only the US and the UK 
where fake news circulates. After the failed 
coup attempt in 2016, Turkey’s leading 
newspaper Sozcu published gruesome 
images purportedly showing anti-coup 
protesters cutting the throat of a captured 
soldier (Genc, 2017). The report carried no 
credits for the pictures and did not carry 
any quotes from eye-witnesses. It was 
later revealed that the image could not be 
verified nor could a beheaded soldier be 
found in the Istanbul morgue. In this case 
both progressive and conservative media 
used the false image to advance their 
political causes.
Experts, facts and algorithms
Are citizens becoming immune to fact-
based reasoning? Traditional media 
struggles to staunch or counter the online 
circulation of misinformation; indeed, 
it often reproduces it under editorial 
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pressures. Peer to peer online transmission 
of misinformation undercuts professional 
journalism. Sources recommended by a 
friend are less likely to be challenged or 
ignored than journalistic sources. Instead 
they are rapidly re-tweeted or ‘liked’. 
Pseudo-democratic intimacy is supplanting 
hierarchies of impersonal expertise. During 
the Brexit campaign Conservative politician 
Michael Gove claimed that British people 
“had had enough of experts”.
Within expert cultures truth is restricted 
to the performance by insiders of cognitive 
competence to discriminate between 
knowledge claims. But beyond expert 
cultures, grounds other than cognitive 
competence are necessary, for instance that 
the claims of physics are accepted more 
or less universally by a public culture of 
non-physicists (Turner, 2001). Hence there 
is a vast difference between generalised 
public validating audiences and specialised 
validation audiences. Since knowledge 
claims are validated by different audiences, 
conflicts between democratic opinion and 
expert opinion are unavoidable. The issue is 
how competing positions are mediated.
The legitimation and diffusion of 
expert knowledge takes the form of a 
communicative process. For a democracy 
expert communication cannot take the 
form of a rubber stamp that fixes cognitive 
authority for all time. Expertise necessarily 
takes the form of a messy political process, 
not an absolute guarantee. Lacking 
public validation, the authority of experts 
will enter into conflict with democratic 
processes. This is the source of the endless 
culture war, confusion and ignorance that 
post-truth seeks to galvanise.
 
‘Facts’ are required to confirm shared 
worldviews. With reduced exposure to 
inconvenient facts and counter arguments, 
political literacy is narrowing. People 
choose to hear what they want to hear. 
In one sense, the postmodernist ideology 
that captivated Western intellectuals a 
number of decades ago has come home 
to roost (Van Zoonen, 2012). Crudely 
stated, postmodernism posited that 
all truths are merely narrative claims 
with no foundational basis for veracity 
and therefore no truth claim could be 
definitively superior to any other truth 
claim. Claims for truth fell under the 
suspicion that they were simply a disguised 
ruse to grab power and assert privilege. 
The current crisis of facts is part of a 
much longer process of communication 
shift from facts to data (Davies, 2016). A 
concern for factual information beyond 
subjective interpretation emerged with 
modern accountancy practices, followed by 
developed statistical methods in science, 
administration and economics. Market 
research surveys and opinion polls began 
to be deployed around a century ago to 
manipulate political outcomes. All this 
provided government policies with an air of 
objectivity beyond the reach of ideological 
dispute. At the same time the emergence 
of modern communications systems, from 
newspapers, railways, radio to television, 
surmounted the physical and emotional 
distance between politicians and citizens.
 
Sound and vision made the political leader 
familiar to mass audiences as a charismatic 
personality. With the arrival of the picture 
press in the 1890s, modern popular 
journalism shifted the public domain away 
from the practice of democratic politics 
to the personalised bonds of a privatised 
media. An impartial but partisan truth was 
established by the use of pictures, captions, 
headlines and stories (Hartley, 1992). Facts 
are what can be seen. A tension is inscribed 
into news journalism between the ‘truth’ 
found in the coherence of visualised order 
and the ‘fake’ exposed by random disorder. 
Universal status was claimed for both an 
adversarial truth and an adversarial ‘we’ 
community of national readers against the 
imputed falsehoods of ‘them’ the outsider 
group – political opponents, terrorists, 
youth, minority ethnicities or religions, 
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.
William Davies (2016) argues that fears of 
a post-truth society express the anxieties 
produced by a large-scale transition from 
‘a society of facts’ to ‘a society of data’. 
Thanks to what is called the ‘internet of 
things’ – smartphones, smartcards, social 
media, e-commerce and sensory devices 
in public spaces – vast quantities of data, 
‘big data’, are being generated by the banal 
routines of daily life. The algorithms of 
social media are designed to anticipate 
and confirm existing preferences, biases 
and prejudices, what is known as ‘bio-
psycho-social profiling’. While facts can 
be viewed as a more or less stable reality 
that politicians might argue about, big 
data, by contrast, measures ‘sentiment 
analysis’. Bio-psycho-social profiling 
monitors the fluctuating, momentary 
responses, the emotive ‘public sentiments’ 
of users and audiences. Impersonal facts 
are losing out to sentimental data. For 
Davies, as big data proliferate, as measures 
of temporary feelings and attitudes and 
agreed facts are squeezed out, it will 
become increasing difficult to establish 
a broad public consensus to identify and 
address fundamental social, economic and 
environmental problems.
However, a different kind of post-truth 
consensus is being constructed by the 
corporate, governmental and ideological 
manipulation of big data, algorithms 
and bio-psycho-social profiling. As Andy 
Wigmore, Leave.EU’s communications 
director, told Observer journalist Carole 
Cadwalladr (2017): 
“. . . using artificial intelligence, as we 
did, tells you all sorts of things about 
that individual and how to convince 
them with what sort of advert. And 
you knew there would also be other 
people in their network who liked 
what they liked, so you could spread. 
And then you follow them. The 
computer never stops learning and it 
never stops monitoring”. 
Politicians are beginning to come to 
terms with big data techniques for 
manipulating behavioural change. Until 
recently they had approached attitudinal 
Sean Spicer claimed that “someone as despicable as Hitler didn’t even sink to using 
chemical weapons”.
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change ‘in such crass ways’ according 
to Nigel Oakes, founder of strategic 
communications firm SCL (Briant, 2015: 
64). Trump’s single biggest election donor 
was billionaire Robert Mercer, joint CEO of 
Renaissance Technologies, a hedge fund 
that uses algorithms to model and trade 
on financial markets (Cadwalladr , 2017). 
Trump’s campaign manager and now chief 
strategist is Steve Bannon, close associate 
of Mercer. Mercer funded the Media 
Research Center to correct ‘liberal bias’ in 
the media and donated $10m for Bannon 
to found Breitbart – an extreme right-
wing libertarian news site that propagates 
antisemitic and Islamophobic sentiment. 
With 2 billion page views a year Breitbart 
is the biggest political site on Facebook and 
Twitter. 
Mercer is also reported to have a $10m 
stake in Cambridge Analytica, a small 
data analytics company that specialises 
in ‘messaging and information operation’ 
developed for ‘psyops’, information 
operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
as mass propaganda attempts to 
manipulate emotions and change behaviour 
(Cadwalladr, 2017). Cambridge Analytica 
also worked for both the Trump and the 
Leave campaigns and claims that it has 
psychological profiles of 220 million 
American citizens, almost the entire US 
electorate. 
Collective memory and post-truth
History shapes how we think about the 
future and collective memory shapes 
how we think about history. Collective 
memory in its turn is shaped by patterns of 
communication. Unreliable communication 
repeated over time will produce false or 
distorted collective memories. Whatever 
gets repeated gets remembered. Concerns 
have been raised that Twitter in particular 
is reducing the contemporary media ecology 
to the trite, the simplistic, the impulsive, 
and the uncivil. Some consider that the ‘age 
of Twitter’ could have been invented as the 
ideal medium for Trump’s personality and 
style of politics (Ott, 2017). Trump’s twitter 
account has around 13 million followers, 
although the majority of these may be 
fake or inactive (Ott, 2017: 64). Twitter’s 
character limitations demand brevity and 
simplicity. As a mobile technology it can be 
used almost anywhere without restraint and 
so encourage impetuous tweets. Its very 
informality and impersonality encourages 
traits of aggressive self-promotion and 
narcissism. 
Collective memory, of course, has always 
been fallible. However, with the self-
reinforcing mechanisms of social media 
sites like Twitter, Facebook and Instagram, 
the reliability of collective memory is 
becoming more vulnerable to distortion 
and misrepresentation (Spinney, 2017). 
Social media functions as an echo chamber 
that reproduces the predispositions of 
group ideology. When a network settles 
on an agreed account, collective memory 
becomes relatively impervious to alternative 
accounts, even if more factually accurate. 
Yet while collective memory shores up the 
group identity of insiders and insulates 
them from the perspectives of outsiders, 
it can also become more expansive and 
inclusive if collective fears, threats and 
tensions are reduced sufficiently. 
Top: An angry reaction by a voter to Jeremy Corbyn’s appearance on her doorstep? 
But has it been ‘photoshopped’? Below is a very similar image, credited to a PA 
photographer. The fist she makes could well signify support/solidarity for Corbyn. 
How do we know if either is ‘fake’? Especially when the comparison appeared in a 
clickbait spread hosted by Buzzfeed.com
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Young people in particular are thought to 
be susceptible to self-confirming networks. 
They engage far less with traditional news 
consumption and are easily bored by 
political reporting. Social media reinforces 
a culture of distraction among young 
people instantly feeding on depthless 
fragments of information. But it is also 
possible that, contrary to received wisdom, 
young people may be exposed to a wider 
range of viewpoints online and dialogically 
undertake critical fact-checking outside of 
the paternal care of (declining) journalistic 
authority. Such heightened political literacy 
was evident in the online and offline 
grassroots movement during the 2014 
referendum in Scotland (Law, 2014-15). 
Science, communication and post-
truth
Post-truth partisanship depends on 
circuits of self-propagation. The sociology 
of science has for a long time called 
into question the principle of absolute 
truth as an independent entity on the 
basis that other scientific networks, 
infrastructures and validation structures 
could well produce other forms of verifiable 
knowledge. Historians of science have 
found that attempts to dispel myths 
by expert knowledge may only have 
the contrary effect of increasing the 
emotional commitment to an unshakable 
and unfalsifiable core belief. It is not only 
a credulous public that takes emotional 
satisfaction in myths. Consider the absence 
of credible evidence for the widely accepted 
idea within educational research that 
learning is done most effectively when it is 
tailored to the supposedly unique ‘learning 
styles’ of individual students.
Scientific evidence is denigrated and 
traduced as merely another type of opinion. 
The Trump administration refuses to accept 
scientific evidence of climate change 
based on experiments, field observations 
and theory. When The Spectator magazine 
carried an article by James Delingpole, 
editor of the Alt-right Breitbart London 
website, challenging scientific findings 
on ocean acidification as an invention of 
‘climate alarmists’, the scientific coordinator 
of the UK research programme on ocean 
acidification, Phil Williamson (2016), 
complained to the magazine without 
reply and referred his complaint to the 
Independent Press Standards Organisation. 
While Williamson acknowledges that there 
are scientific uncertainties, research has 
been accumulated by around one hundred 
scientist and 250 peer-reviewed papers. 
Delingpole ignored these and claimed that 
‘man-made global warming theory is a 
busted flush’ and ocean acidification is 
a ‘trivial’ ‘scaremongering theory’ about 
which nothing new can be learned that 
could not be uncovered by ‘a few hours’ 
basic research [sic]’. 
IPSO’s code of practice states: ‘The Press, 
while free to editorialise and campaign, 
must distinguish clearly between comment, 
conjecture and fact’. Yet IPSO ruled against 
Williamson’s complaint and his appeal 
about The Spectator article, which it judged 
had not breached the code of practice on 
the basis that it was purely a ‘comment 
piece’ challenging the scientific consensus. 
Against ill-informed, ideologically-driven 
opinion, scientists, Williamson claims, are 
faced with Brandolini’s law ‘(also known 
as the Bullshit Asymmetry Principle): the 
amount of energy needed to refute bullshit 
is an order of magnitude bigger than that 
needed to produce it’. Media literacy on 
its own is insufficient to counter the anti-
democratic manipulation of the public by 
post-truth and fake news.
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